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Currently, most requests for clinical ethics consultation involve end-of-life issues. Should a feeding 
tube or ventilator be withdrawn from a 
dying person? Should a do-not-attempt-
resuscitation order be written without the 
patient’s or surrogate’s consent? Should 
a neonatal intensive care unit team oblige 
a parent’s request to keep a severely 
impaired neonate alive on maximum 
life support despite probable mortality? 
Since the field of bioethics arose to ad-
dress dilemmas associated with emerging 
life-prolonging medical technologies, it’s 
not surprising that clinical ethics focuses 
predominantly on end-of-life decision-
making. But this has engendered wide-
spread feelings of distrust among disabil-
ity rights activists toward clinical ethics 
consultants and the health care providers 
they advise, whom they view as being 
wholly ignorant of disability rights and 
the social model of disability.* 
In a session at the conference “Disabil-
ity, Health Care & Ethics—What Really 
Matters” on April 28th, co-sponsored by 
Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee 
Network (MHECN) and Kennedy Krieg-
er Institute, I explored the origins of this 
distrust as it relates to end-of-life care. 
There is some commonality between 
hospice/end-of-life care and disability 
rights advocacy—both value holistic care 
centered on maximizing an individual’s 
quality of life; when possible, in a home-
based setting. But the ultimate fear of 
many hospice patients is dying alone and 
in pain or other distress, whereas the very 
real fear of many persons with a dis-
Bioethics through a DisaBility leNs
ability is dying too soon at the hands of 
health care workers who do not see the 
worth in prolonging their lives, and the 
associated burdens and costs. Research 
studies have corroborated the latter. Non-
disabled persons and health care provid-
ers are more likely to rate the quality of 
life of persons with disabilities as poor, 
while individuals who have a disability 
rate their own quality of life as good or 
better (Bach & Tilton, 1994; Gerhart, et 
al., 1994; Lule et al., 2009). Reasons that 
persons with disabilities sometimes rate 
their quality of life as poor often have 
more to do with others’ negative attitudes 
toward them, and barriers that exclude 
them from meaningful work and social 
activities, than to their mental or physi-
cal impairment(s). The unemployment 
rate of 66% among persons with disabili-
ties—unchanged for over twenty years—
is just one example of rampant disability 
discrimination.  
In 1991, Leonard Kriegel made the 
argument on behalf of the disability com-
munity:
“Our complaint against society is 
not that it ignores our presence but 
that it ignores our reality, our sense 
of ourselves as humans brave enough 
to capture our destinies against odds 
that are formidable. Here is where 
the cripple and society war with each 
other. If we were satisfied to be held 
up for compassion, to be infantilized 
on telethons, we would discover that 
this America has a great deal of time 
for us, a great deal of room for us 
inside this issue . . .
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died, he made repeated requests that 
his ventilator be stopped. The prin-
ciple of respect for patient autonomy 
was used to justify complying with his 
wishes. The health care team believed 
the man knew that stopping the venti-
lator would cause his death, and that 
he was freely choosing to die. They 
saw their role basically as following a 
dying man’s request and palliating his 
suffering. Kaufert and Koch, however, 
suggest that this man may have cho-
sen to die not based on an informed, 
autonomous wish, but because he was 
depressed at his wife’s recent death, 
and fearful of living in an institution 
due to the lack of a home caregiver 
to help with his daily physical needs. 
Instead of simply complying with his 
wish to stop life support, Kaufert and 
Koch argue that health care providers 
were obligated to address this man’s 
grief over his wife’s death and lack 
of home support, present options for 
social and community services to allow 
him to remain in his home, and arrange 
for him to meet with other long-time 
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a 
membership organization, established by the Law and Health Care Program 
at the University of Maryland School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is 
to facilitate and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making 
in health care settings by supporting and providing informational and 
educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in 
the state of Maryland. The Network works to achieve this goal by:
   • Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate  
 ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to assist  
 their institution to act consistently with its mission statement;
   • Fostering communication and information sharing among Network  
      members;
   • Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other 
      healthcare providers, and members of the general public on ethical  
 issues in health care; and
   • Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees 
 and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
in a heart open to praise for its 
own generosity. … In literature 
… [and] on television as bathetic 
as the stream of smiling children 
paraded before our eyes as if their 
palsy were Jerry Lewis’s reason 
for living, what we invariably 
discover is that our true selves, 
our own inner lives, have been 
auctioned off so that we can be 
palatable rather than real. We 
can serve the world as victim or 
demon, the object of its charity or 
its terror. But the only thing we 
can be certain of is that the world 
would prefer to turn a blind eye 
and a deaf ear to our real selves—
and that it will do precisely that 
until we impose those selves on the 
world.” (pp. 65-66).
Kaufert and Koch (2003) present an 
example of how disability bias influ-
ences end-of-life care in describing a 
case involving a man with amyotropic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS) who opted for a 
tracheotomy and portable ventilator to 
prolong his life. After the man’s wife 
Bioethics
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cal and mental disabilities. We can 
support hiring policies that welcome 
disability activists, independent living 
center organizers, and persons with 
disabilities. And we can examine our 
own fears and emotions surrounding 
death and disability that may influence 
how we approach ethical decision-
making in health care. As Johnson 
(2006) wrote:  
“… Most people resist looking 
too closely at the kinds of issues 
that await us when we lose the 
ability to communicate. We do 
not like thinking about disability 
any more than we like thinking 
about death or end of life issues. 
We do not like facing the reality 
of incapacitated lives. If only we 
could achieve a willingness to 
raise the veil of denial about the 
shadow-world of brain damage 
and decision-making, it might 
serve as a legacy from the Terri 
Schiavo ordeal.”
With health care reform underway, 
and the prevalence of disability rising, 
ventilator users. They cite David Jayne 
to portray the mainstream view that 
prolonging the life of patients with 
ALS causes undue burden not only on 
the patient, but on others caring for the 
patient. As Jayne stated, looking back 
on his decision to have tracheotomy 
surgery to allow for long-term ventila-
tor use:
“My now ex-wife told me how 
selfish I was for wanting to live. 
That my young children had suf-
fered enough and it would cause 
them only more pain. It was a 
sickening sense of abandonment. 
I have absolutely no doubt if I did 
not have the ability to communi-
cate my desires the [tracheotomy] 
surgery would not have taken 
place.” (Jayne, 2005)
Discriminatory attitudes about 
the quality of life of a person who 
breathes with a ventilator need to be 
challenged—whether for a person with 
ALS or a spinal cord injury. Not doing 
so reveals a disability bias that Kaufert 
and Koch point out is pervasive among 
health care professionals. 
Similarly, Johnson (2006) compares 
how most heath care providers and 
bioethicists viewed the Terri Schiavo 
case as an end-of-life case, whereas 
disability rights groups like Not Dead 
Yet viewed it as a disability rights 
case. The former cited evidence sup-
porting withdrawing Ms. Schiavo’s 
feeding tube to include that she would 
never recover from her persistent 
vegetative state (PVS), that her g-tube 
feedings were a medical treatment that 
was delaying her death, that she did 
not want to be kept alive in her condi-
tion, and that the burdens of keeping 
her alive with the feedings outweighed 
any benefits (Goodman, 2006). 
Disability rights advocates such as 
ADAPT (American Disabled for At-
tendant Programs Today), The ARC of 
the United States, and Not Dead Yet 
asserted that because PVS 
is often misdiagnosed, 
one should err on the as-
sumption that a person 
may have some level of 
consciousness, even if the 
person cannot commu-
nicate. They highlighted 
that there was no hard 
evidence of Terri Schiavo’s 
wishes, and that even if 
she had completed a living 
will, advance directives 
are inherently disability-
biased (see Derbyshire & 
Levy, July 2010). Advance 
directives require people 
to state preferences for 
life-prolonging treatments 
they might want in the 
future, but studies show 
that able-bodied persons 
often change their minds about their 
preferences for life-prolonging treat-
ments when they become disabled. 
Most people with disabilities do not 
view wheelchairs, ventilators, and 
feeding tubes as medical devices—
rather, they view them as empowering 
adaptive devices. And they take issue 
with the assumption many make that if 
an individual cannot recover from an 
impairment—such as PVS—this may 
justify withholding or withdrawing hy-
dration, nutrition, or other life support 
measures (Johnson, 2006).  
So, how can we health care provid-
ers and clinical ethicists better ad-
dress disability rights issues? For one, 
we can increase our knowledge and 
awareness of disability perspectives. 
Disability blogs are a good way to 
start (see Box above). We can ensure 
that there is adequate representation 
of disability perspectives on our ethics 
committees by including members 
with knowledge about the social and 
medical models of disability, the his-
tory of disability rights advocacy, and 
state resources for persons with physi-
DISABILITY BLOGS 
Bad cripple 
http://badcripple.blogspot.com/
disability news 
http://www.patriciaebauer.com/
disability studies, temple University 
http://disstud.blogspot.com/
life with a severely disabled child 
http://severedisabilitykid.blogspot.com/
Media dis&dat  
http://media-dis-n-dat.blogspot.com/
Mysteries and Questions  
surrounding the Ashley X case 
http://huahima.wordpress.com/ 
Planet of the Blind
http://www.planet-of-the-blind.com/
What sorts of People 
http://whatsortsofpeople.wordpress.com/
Cont. on page 14
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curVes: a MNeMoNic for DeterMiNiNg MeDical  
DecisioN-MakiNg capacity aND proViDiNg eMergeNcy 
treatMeNt iN the acute settiNg
The evaluation of medical decision-making capacity and provision of emergency 
treatment in the acute setting may 
present a significant challenge for 
both physicians-in-training and 
attending physicians. Although 
absolutely essential to the proper 
care of patients, recalling criteria for 
decision-making capacity may prove 
difficult during a medical emergency. 
Furthermore, emergencies present a 
particularly challenging situation for 
assessing decision-making capacity, 
as altered mental status is frequently 
a confounding factor. Stakes may 
be high, with the absence or delay 
of treatment quickly leading to loss 
of life or limb. In addition, discord 
with regard to determination of 
decision-making capacity may be 
commonplace among medical staff 
despite access to the same clinical 
information and laboratory data. In 
an emergency, therefore, it becomes 
imperative that decision-making 
capacity be assessed in an efficient 
manner. Although several tools exist 
that can assist in the evaluation for 
capacity (Dunn, et al., 2006; Grisso, 
et al., 1997), they frequently prove 
cumbersome, time consuming, and 
difficult to perform in an acute care 
setting.  Of equal importance to 
determining capacity are recognition 
of a true medical emergency and 
recollection of the criteria required 
to provide emergency treatment in 
the absence of explicit informed 
consent. This article presents two 
cases that illustrate the need for 
quick assessment of decision-
making capacity and the criteria 
for emergency treatment. It then 
provides and demonstrates the use of 
a mnemonic (CURVES: Choose and 
Communicate, Understand, Reason, 
Value, Emergency, Surrogate) that 
addresses the abilities a patient must 
possess in order to have adequate 
decision-making capacity, as well as 
when emergency treatment can be 
provided without patient consent.
clinical cases
Case 1
Ms. S. is an 84-year-old woman 
with a history of severe chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD). She presents with a 1-week 
history of progressively worsening 
shortness of breath, cough, increase 
in clear sputum production, and 
wheezing. On examination, the 
patient appears in extremis. Her 
respiratory rate is 28, and she is using 
accessory musculature to breathe. 
There are diffuse, quiet wheezes 
in her lungs bilaterally, with an 
ominous lack of air movement. An 
arterial blood gas reveals a markedly 
decompensated respiratory acidosis, 
and the overall picture appears 
consistent with a life-threatening 
COPD exacerbation. Hospital 
admission with either noninvasive 
positive pressure ventilation, 
intubation, and/or comfort care 
measures are presented to the patient 
as the possible responses to her 
situation. However, the patient states 
“I want to die at home. Please, let me 
go home.” 
The doctors involved are faced 
with the following questions: Should 
the patient be discharged home, with 
the knowledge that this will likely 
result in her death? Does this patient 
have adequate capacity to make this 
decision? 
Case 2
Mr. M. is a 53-year-old morbidly 
obese man who was admitted for 
suspected obesity hypoventilation 
syndrome and obstructive sleep 
apnea. The on-call physician is called 
to his bedside emergently, after he 
was found unresponsive to verbal and 
noxious stimuli. Arterial blood gas 
reveals a combination of hypoxia and 
decompensated respiratory acidosis. 
On lung examination, there is a 
complete lack of respiratory effort, 
and there are no breath sounds. The 
patient is ventilated with a bag-valve 
mask at maximal supplemental 
oxygen, and he partially arouses, but 
remains groggy. Respiratory effort 
is somewhat restored, to a rate of 
6 breaths/min. Bedside oximetry 
increases to 89%. However, the 
patient’s head begins to bob, and 
it appears that he will soon lose 
consciousness. Anesthesia is paged 
for a stat intubation. 
Two minutes pass, and anesthesia 
arrives. The patient has become 
more awake and is looking around 
the room. His pulse oximeter is now 
Grant V. Chow, MD, Matthew J. Czarny, BS, Mark T. Hughes, MD, MA & Joseph A. Carrese, MD, MPH 
Department of Medicine and the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, 
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Baltimore, MD
Note: This article is an abbreviated version of an article by the same title published in CHEST in February 2010 
(137(2):421-427). This revised version is presented here with the written permission of the Editors of CHEST. The full, 
original article can be found at http://chestjournal.chestpubs.org/content/137/2/421.full  
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reading 93%, although respirations 
remain shallow and infrequent. Given 
his significant respiratory acidosis, 
the medical team prepares for 
intubation. At this time, the patient 
shouts “I don’t want a tube! No 
tube!” 
The doctors involved are faced with 
the following questions: Should this 
patient be intubated? Does he have 
the capacity to decide his course of 
therapy?  
 
the cURVEs Mnemonic
We propose a mnemonic, CURVES 
(Choose and Communicate, 
Understand, Reason, Value, 
Emergency, Surrogate), to aid in 
the evaluation of decision-making 
capacity in an emergency. (Fig 1). 
• c – choose and 
communicate. Patients must 
be able to choose from among 
the options before them. 
Furthermore, their choice must 
be made without coercion 
or manipulation, although 
appropriate persuasion is 
permitted (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001). Each patient 
must be able to communicate 
his or her preferences, whether 
verbally, in writing, or through 
the use of signals
• U – Understand. The patient 
must understand the relevant 
risks, benefits, alternatives, 
and consequences of any 
planned intervention or course 
of action. The following 
questions may be helpful in 
assessing the patient’s degree 
of understanding:
o “In your own words, please 
tell me about what we’ve 
just discussed, regarding 
your current illness and the 
decisions we need to make.” 
o “What do you think will 
happen if you receive 
(or do not receive) the 
intervention?”
o “What do you understand to 
be the alternative(s) to the 
recommended plan?”
• R – Reason. The patient must 
be able to reason and provide 
adequate explanations for 
accepting or declining each 
intervention. 
• V – Value. The patient’s 
decision should be consistent 
with his or her value system. 
Physicians should strive to 
be aware of and understand 
the patient’s values, and they 
must also be aware that patient 
values and goals may change 
with time. The following 
question may be helpful in 
determining the degree to 
which the patient’s values are 
playing a prominent role in the 
decision being made:
o “How did you reach your 
decision to accept (or reject) 
the intervention, and what is 
guiding your thinking about 
this?”
If the patient lacks the ability 
to choose and communicate, 
understand, reason, or act 
consistently with his/her 
values (to a degree consistent 
with the benefits and risks 
of the decision), adequate 
decision-making capacity is 
not present. In such cases, the 
physician must next determine 
if emergency treatment should 
be rendered, provided that two 
additional requirements are met 
(American College of Legal 
Medicine, 2007; Dunn, et al., 
2006; Grisso, et al., 1997). 
Cont. on page 6
Fig. 1
 
Does the patient have 
decision-making capacity? 
Can emergency treatment 
without informed consent be 
provided? 
choosE & coMMUnicAtE – Can the patient 
communicate a choice? 
UndERstAnd  - Does the patient understand the risks, 
benefits, alternatives, and consequences of the decision? 
REAson – Is the patient able to reason and provide 
logical explanations for the decision? 
VAlUE  Is the decision in accordance with the patient’s 
value system? 
EMERGEncY – Is there a serious and imminent risk to 
the patient’s well-being? 
sURRoGAtE – Is there a surrogate decision-maker 
available? 
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• E – Emergency. A true 
emergency exists; that is, there is 
serious and imminent risk to life 
or limb. 
• s – surrogate. No surrogate 
decision maker or legal 
document detailing the patient’s 
desires is immediately available, 
and there is no time to obtain an 
ethics consultation. 
When both of these conditions 
are present in the context of lack of 
medical decision-making capacity, 
a physician may intervene without 
explicit informed consent, as long as 
the proposed intervention would be 
acceptable to a reasonable person or to 
the patient if they were able to speak 
for themselves. It is important to note 
that such an action does not occur 
in the complete absence of consent; 
rather, the physician is operating under 
the presumption of implied consent 
(Derse, 2005).
Next we return to the cases and 
use the CURVES mnemonic to work 
through them and arrive at a plan of 
action.
Case 1: Refusal of Hospital Admission 
in a Life-Threatening COPD 
Exacerbation
Ms. S. is found to be alert, oriented, 
and vocal. The different courses of 
action that may be taken (noninvasive 
positive pressure ventilation, 
intubation, and medically-supported 
comfort care measures) are presented 
to her, and she is able to repeat each 
option, using her own words. She 
states, “I don’t want a mask or tube. I 
don’t want any machines. I just want 
to die in my own home.” She voices 
understanding that leaving the hospital 
would result in worsened breathing 
and possibly death. The patient’s adult 
children, who were eventually found 
in the Emergency Department waiting 
room, corroborate both the reasoning 
process and her decision as consistent 
with previously stated preferences and 
values. 
Ms. S. should be allowed to return 
home, even if that means she will die 
there.
Case 2: Refusal of Intubation in 
Hypercapnic Respiratory Failure
Mr. M. is able to slowly recite his 
name, birth date, and location. He 
explains his refusal of intubation by 
stating: “I just don’t want it.” He 
mumbles when asked to repeat, in 
his own words, the risks, benefits, 
or alternatives to intubation. He 
cannot explain the consequences of 
his refusal. Review of the patient’s 
admission note reveals that he 
previously desired intubation, if 
medically necessary. No surrogate 
decision-makers are immediately 
available. 
Emergency treatment in the 
absence of informed consent should 
be provided, and Mr. M. should be 
intubated.
summary
The process of approaching and 
evaluating decision-making capacity 
in the emergency setting may be 
facilitated by recalling our proposed 
mnemonic, CURVES. The physician 
assesses decision-making capacity by 
determining the patient’s ability to: 
Choose and Communicate a course of 
action; Understand the intervention’s 
risks, benefits, alternatives, and 
consequences; Reason and provide 
logical explanations for the choice; and 
apply his or her Values to the decision. 
If these functional abilities are intact, 
then under most circumstances, 
the patient’s preferences should be 
honored. If any of these functional 
abilities are lacking, and the patient is 
deemed not to have adequate decision-
making capacity, then the physician 
must determine if a true Emergency 
exists and assess availability of a 
Surrogate decision maker. If an 
emergency situation is present and a 
surrogate cannot be found in a timely 
manner, then emergency treatment 
may be provided for a medical 
condition warranting intervention. 
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patieNts without proxies: 
what's happeNiNg iN other states?
Cynthia Griggins, PhD, MA is co-director of the Clinical Ethics Service at University Hospitals in Case Medical Center, Cleveland, 
Ohio. She summarizes here a hospital protocol she helped develop to make medical decisions for seriously ill (but not necessarily 
terminally ill) patients who do not have an available surrogate decision-maker.
For some time we at Case West-ern Reserve Hospital have been aware of a growing number of 
unfortunate patients who arrive at our 
teaching hospital, incapacitated and 
requiring complex medical care, but 
without anyone to serve as a surrogate 
decision-maker.  These patients are 
sometimes elderly nursing home resi-
dents who have outlived all relatives. 
Often they are homeless mentally ill 
individuals who long ago lost all ties 
to families or friends. Other times 
they are isolated “loners” brought to 
the hospital by a neighbor or acquain-
tance who is concerned but who lacks 
either moral or legal authority to make 
decisions for the patient.  The patient 
requires care for which consent is 
necessary. It might be aggressive care 
in an ICU, a major surgery, an ampu-
tation, or referral to hospice care, but 
search for family turns up no one.
Decision-making is clear if the 
situation is a true emergency: assume 
consent and act to save life or limb. It 
is also relatively clear if there is ample 
time before a decision has to be made: 
approach the court and request that 
a guardian be appointed. However, 
getting a guardian takes six to eight 
weeks in our urban county, making 
this approach untenable most of the 
time. Even if it were possible to wait, 
it would be cruel, costly, and unethi-
cal to allow a patient to go untreated 
for that length of time, just as it would 
be unethical to wait until the patient’s 
condition worsened to the point of an 
emergency, thus allowing physicians 
Cont. on page 8
to act without formal consent. More-
over, our overworked probate court 
has neither the time nor the resources 
to appoint “emergency guardians” to 
make medical decisions.  
Disturbed by the inconsistent man-
ner in which decisions were being 
made for these “patients without prox-
ies (PWPs),” our hospital ethics com-
mittee decided to develop a protocol. 
We began with several assumptions. 
First, we felt that placing the burden 
of decision-making on treating physi-
cians posed an unacceptable conflict 
of interest and could lead to unwanted 
outcomes. An individual physician’s 
bias can cause her to either overtreat 
or undertreat a seriously ill patient. 
Fear of lawsuits can result in defensive 
case westerN's MoDel aND MarylaND law
The problem of “patients without proxies” has troubled clinicians and policy makers 
for years. See, for example, Karp 
N. and Wood E., “Incapacitated and 
Alone: Healthcare Decision Making 
for Unbefriended Older People,” Hu-
man Rights, Volume 31, no. 2 (2004), 
20-24. Case Western’s innovative 
approach should be seen as a promis-
ing pilot study.
Hospitals in Maryland that might 
want to adopt Case Western’s model 
should be aware, however, of differ-
ences in the legal context between 
Ohio and Maryland. The Case 
Western approach was initiated in 
part because delays of many weeks in 
guardianships compromised quality 
care. If, by contrast, the circuit court 
in a Maryland county responds in a 
timely way to petitions for emergency 
guardianship, a hospital in that county 
may have no need for an interim in-
formed consent mechanism.
But suppose that a Maryland hos-
pital, like Case Western, sometimes 
is troubled by delays in guardianship. 
Before adopting Case Western’s ap-
proach, a Maryland hospital should 
seek advice from its counsel about 
how such a role for ethics committee 
members fits within the framework 
of Maryland law. In effect, ethics 
committee members would serve as 
surrogates who are not authorized as 
such in the Health Care Decisions Act 
(HCDA). Although neither the HCDA 
nor other law explicitly prohibits clini-
cian reliance on such an informed con-
sent mechanism, one effect would 
be loss of the immunity granted by 
the HCDA. Of course, the absence 
of immunity does not equate to li-
ability, and I myself doubt that most 
cases of interim decision making for 
an unbefriended patient pose any 
real risk of liability for the clinicians 
who accept the informed consent 
or refusal of the ethics committee 
members. Nevertheless, other law-
yers may not agree. Consequently, 
a Maryland hospital should proceed 
cautiously before emulating Case 
Western’s approach.
Jack schwartz, Jd
Visiting Professor and 
Health Law & Policy Fellow 
University of Maryland 
School of Law
8  Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter
Patients Without Proxies
Cont. from page 7
medicine rather than decisions made 
in the patient’s best interest. Alterna-
tively, without someone to advocate 
for the patient, a physician may fail 
to offer reasonable options or may 
withdraw treatment too soon.  Second, 
we believed that decisions for PWPs 
should not be made by employees of 
the hospital. Again, conflict of inter-
est was our main concern, but we also 
believed that a lay person’s viewpoint 
was needed to challenge and counter-
balance the medically-based thinking 
of the treatment team. Finally, we were 
committed to transparency and ac-
countability. Decisions for PWPs and 
the process by which they were made 
should be open and readily available 
to examination by anyone who raised 
legitimate questions.
With the help of the hospital at-
torneys, we researched our state law 
to determine whether there were any 
statutes to guide us or limit us in our 
planning. State laws vary in providing 
guidelines for making decisions for 
patients without proxies; our own is si-
lent on the matter. After checking with 
the local probate court, adult protec-
tion agencies, and adult guardianship 
programs (who all declined to take 
on the task of decision-making for 
hospitalized patients and gave us their 
blessing), we received the hospital 
administration’s approval to proceed.
Our own PWP protocol is built on a 
model first proposed by the Veterans 
Affairs (VA), with some modifications. 
A small subgroup of the hospital’s eth-
ics committee was formed, consisting 
of community members who would 
be readily accessible (within 24 hours) 
for decision-making. These individu-
als, usually not medically-trained, but 
versed in ethical decision-making, do 
not work for the hospital. Currently 
the subcommittee consists of several 
professors, psychologists, lawyers, and 
a music teacher with some training in 
bioethics. 
The protocol states that the ethics 
consultant on call and a social worker 
be notified as soon as it is suspected 
that a seriously ill and incapacitated 
patient may lack a surrogate. The 
social worker, with the assistance 
of the ethics consultant, launches an 
aggressive search for family, follow-
ing all possible leads. They contact 
nursing homes, neighbors, landlords, 
local police, relevant service agencies, 
and anyone who may know the pa-
tient, asking not only about relatives, 
but also about the patient’s history, 
lifestyle, values, and quality of life, 
gathering information and preparing 
for later discussions of what might 
be in the patient’s best interests. For 
example, nursing home staff may tell 
us that despite her dementia, a patient 
has been relatively active and content 
in the nursing home, suggesting that 
a return to baseline might be a desir-
able goal. Or a neighbor may tell us 
that a patient has become increasingly 
withdrawn and invalid since his wife’s 
death, and has repeatedly stated that 
he would not want to live in a nursing 
home or be kept alive in a severely 
disabled condition. 
The intensive search for relatives is 
extremely important. It has been suc-
cessful with about 40% of patients first 
thought to lack proxies. Not only has 
it been a relief to staff to find surrogate 
decision-makers, but it also has been 
gratifying when we have been able to 
re-unite estranged family members 
who then provide support for an iso-
lated patient. The search has, however, 
turned up relatives who refuse to act 
as surrogates, in which case we still 
invite them to participate in decision-
making to the extent that they feel 
comfortable.
When it becomes clear that no 
surrogate can be found, and a major 
medical decision must be made for 
the incapacitated patient, the ethics 
consultant then convenes the PWP 
committee. The consultant guides 
them in reviewing the chart and briefs 
them on background information 
that has been gathered regarding the 
patient’s lifestyle, values, and qual-
ity of life prior to hospitalization. The 
committee members are encouraged 
to meet the patient, and to whatever 
extent possible, communicate with 
her. The committee and ethics con-
sultant then meet with the medical 
team (i.e., the attending physician, 
appropriate consultants, social work, 
nursing, etc.), who present the pa-
tient’s medical condition, and various 
treatment options, with risks, benefits, 
and long-term prognosis articulated 
as much as possible. The committee 
then discusses the various alternatives 
(including comfort care), focusing 
not only on short term demands and 
benefits, but also on long-term quality 
of life. They then make a recommen-
dation to the medical team regarding 
which treatment plan they believe is in 
the patient’s best interest. Usually this 
process is accomplished in a single 
meeting of one to two hours, although 
occasionally a patient’s changing 
medical status requires multiple meet-
ings and communications. The ethics 
consultant records all deliberations 
and recommendations in the patient’s 
medical record.
Because the PWP committee does 
not have the legal standing of a proper 
surrogate, their recommendation is just 
that—a recommendation. As always, 
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the ultimate decision to deliver any 
treatment, such as a surgery, che-
motherapy, or even CPR, lies with 
the attending physician.  However, 
in over 90% of our cases, the physi-
cian has agreed with the committee’s 
recommendation.  Should the attend-
ing physician disagree (or if the PWP 
committee has not been able to reach 
a consensus among themselves), the 
case is presented to an emergency 
meeting of the full ethics committee. If 
full consensus still cannot be reached, 
the protocol dictates that the Chief 
Medical Officer (CMO) should make 
the final decision on the treatment of 
the patient. Although several cases 
have gone to the full ethics committee, 
we have never needed to call upon the 
CMO to decide a case.
focus: eDucatiNg ethics coMMittee MeMBers
Looking for ideas on how to educate ethics committee members at your facility? The 
American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities (ASBH) has published an 
Education Guide to help. In addition 
to general content about clinical eth-
ics and ethics consultation services, 
the Guide includes the following 
content domains, along with learning 
objectives and suggested exercises 
and readings related to each content 
domain: 
Core Ethical Issues Involving Adult 
Patients
• Decision-Making Capacity
• Informed Consent
The hospital administration and at-
torneys approved our protocol, and we 
have now used it for about 70 cases 
over a period of five years (though 
only about 50% have required that the 
PWP committee be convened). Our 
experience with the protocol has been 
extremely positive. We have made 
recommendations regarding code 
status, surgeries, amputations, trache-
ostomies and PEG tubes, dialysis, and 
chemotherapy. Sometimes we have 
recommended aggressive treatments; 
other times we have rejected them and 
recommended comfort care. For those 
patients who are expected to live, we 
have recommended rehab and nursing 
home placement and guardianship for 
future decision-making. For those who 
are not expected to live, we have rec-
ommended palliative care or hospice.
For further information on designing 
a PWP protocol, see Hyun, I, Griggins, 
C, Weiss, M, Robbins, D, Robichaud, 
A and Daly, B. “When patients do not 
have a proxy: A Procedure for medical 
decision making when there is no one 
to speak for the patient.”  The Journal 
of Clinical Ethics, Volume 17, no. 4 
(2006), 323-330.  You can also contact 
me directly:   Cynthia.griggins@uh-
hospitals.org
cynthia Griggins, Phd, MA
Co-Director, Clinical Ethics Service
University Hospitals Case Medical 
Center.
• Surrogate Decision Making
• Advance Care Planning and 
Advance Directives
• End-of-Life Decision-Making
• Privacy and Confidentiality
• Pregnancy and Perinatal Issues
• Dealing with “Difficult” Pa-
tients: Professional and Institu-
tional Responses
• Negotiating Difference and Ac-
counting for Context
Core Ethical Issues Involving Minors
• General Framework for Minors 
and Decision-Making
• Ethical Issues Involving New-
borns & Critically Ill Infants and 
Children
• Ethical Issues Involving 
Chronically Ill Infants, 
• Children and Adolescents
• Ethical Issues Involving 
Adolescents
An Education Guide order form is 
available at http://www.asbh.org.  
The cost is $20 ($15 for ASBH 
members).
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case preseNtatioN
One of the regular features of this Newsletter is the presentation 
of a case considered by an ethics 
committee and an analysis of the 
ethical issues involved. Readers are 
both encouraged to comment on the 
case or analysis and to submit other 
cases that their ethics committee has 
dealt with. In all cases, identifying 
information about patients and others 
in the case should only be provided 
with the permission of the patient. 
Unless otherwise indicated, our 
policy is not to identify the submitter 
or institution. Cases and comments 
should be sent to MHECN@law.
umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law & 
Health Care Program, University 
of Maryland School of Law, 500 W. 
Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.
cAsE fRoM A  
ViRGiniA hosPitAl
A 58 year old white male, residing in a local homeless shelter, exhibited suicidal 
ideations and tendencies, and 
was brought to the hospital 
psychiatric center for evaluation, 
and subsequently, was involuntarily 
admitted. The patient did not have 
any family or significant others. He 
was not compliant, although not 
violent. Having suicidal ideations, as 
well as indications of several suicidal 
attempts, the court found the patient to 
be incompetent. The hospital sought 
guardianship to assist in the decision 
making process with regard to his 
treatment.
After a medical workup, authorized 
by the guardian and the hospital, 
physicians discovered that the patient 
had terminal colon cancer. They also 
determined that a powerful regimen 
of chemotherapy might lengthen the 
patient's life by twelve to eighteen 
months. Unfortunately, this medication 
is known to cause significant nausea 
and vomiting, in addition to other 
severe side effects. The patient refused 
the medication, but was forced to 
receive this treatment against his 
will. The patient became delusional, 
insisting that it was the chemotherapy 
that was causing his cancer.
The nursing staff, physicians, and 
guardian sought assistance from 
the hospital ethics committee for 
advice in the determination and 
evaluation of ethical treatment 
options. Some of the questions put 
before this committee included: Is it 
reasonable to discontinue treatment 
that may preserve life, although at 
a significantly reduced quality of 
life? If so, does the patient's desire to 
discontinue treatment carry any weight 
given the court's adjudication of his 
incompetency, his suicidal ideations 
and his delusional state?
coMMEnts fRoM An 
AttoRnEY
This case raises both substantive and procedural issues with respect to the appropriate role 
of the institution's ethics committee. 
In addition, the case illustrates what 
many in the field know all too well: 
it is generally better to deal with 
most bioethical issues at the earliest 
opportunity, than to wait and do so 
later.
the initial decision to treat
Since this case concerns the 
propriety of reversing a course of 
treatment which was consented to, 
not by, but on behalf of, the patient, a 
decision to withdraw treatment should 
be made on the same basis as was 
the initial authorization. Therefore, a 
discussion about the reasonableness 
of a decision to discontinue 
chemotherapy and what weight, if 
any, should be accorded the patient's 
refusal, must include an analysis 
of the initial decision to commence 
the chemotherapeutic regimen. 
Understanding that initial decision 
is of vital importance and the ethics 
committee must, consequently, explore 
this issue.
The forced administration of 
chemotherapy is assumed to have been 
authorized by the patient's guardian. 
Inasmuch as many chemotherapy 
regimens may involve experimental 
treatment, the importance of obtaining 
valid informed consent to such 
treatment cannot be overlooked. 
Presumably, the Committee will 
discover that the guardian considered 
the risks and benefits to the patient 
from receiving chemotherapy and 
concluded that the benefits outweighed 
the risks, including the risk of 
foregoing treatment. Hopefully, the 
Committee will also determine that 
the guardian specifically concluded 
that the known adverse side effects 
of treatment (as well as the unknown 
risks) were outweighed by the benefits 
associated with a possible increase in 
the patient's life by 12 to 18 months. 
One must wonder, however, whether 
the patient, in a lucid interval would 
concur in such assessment and arrive 
at the same decision. A related issue 
is whether the court order establishing 
the guardianship contemplated and 
enabled decisions of this magnitude 
or whether the court intended only for 
the guardian to make decisions with 
regard to the patient's mental health 
This Case and the following 
Commentaries are reprinted from 
the Fall 1994 issue of the MAEC 
Newsletter
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treatment. If the latter, it makes sense 
to go back to court to enlarge the 
surrogate's power in consideration of 
the patient's condition. 
the decision to discontinue 
   treatment
Taking up the questions of the 
reasonableness of discontinuing 
treatment and whether to accord any 
weight to the patient's apparent desire 
to forego treatment, two responses 
come to mind. Assuming that the 
guardian acted within the scope of the 
court's guardianship appointment and 
in accordance with the patient's best 
interests and gave valid and effective 
informed consent to commence the 
chemotherapy regimen, it seems not 
only unreasonable, but inappropriate, 
to discontinue a potentially life 
lengthening course of treatment. 
The autonomy of this patient has 
been surrendered to the legally 
designated surrogate decision maker, 
the guardian. It makes no sense 
to attribute decisional weight to 
the patient's protestations because 
such objections are not viewed as 
emanating from a rational thought 
process.   Indeed, if a decision 
were to be made to discontinue 
chemotherapy without the guardian's 
consent, what would be the source 
of authority for any such decision. 
In this context, therefore, the ethics 
committee can only confirm that 
informed consent to treatment was 
obtained.
Best interest of the Patient
On the other hand, this case may be 
viewed as one in which the surrogate 
decision maker—the guardian—
appears (to the treatment team) not 
to be acting in the patient's best 
interests and to the extent the patient's 
preferences are at all discernible, the 
treatment decision appears to be at 
odds with such preferences. In this 
situation, it seems appropriate for the 
ethics committee to become involved 
and explore whether the guardian's 
decision making is centered on the 
patient's best interests. It seems 
unreasonable, however, for the 
Committee to go beyond this role 
by attempting to insert itself as the 
decision maker on the question 
of discontinuing treatment or the 
arbiter between the guardian and 
an incompetent ward. Assuming 
the Committee has not been legally 
empowered to wrest decision making 
power from the patient or the patient's 
surrogate, the Committee should 
not affect a change in the treatment 
course without the assent of the 
guardian. As an attorney, I would be 
quite uncomfortable with giving any 
ethics committee that much rope.
If, after reviewing the facts, it is 
evident to the Committee that the 
guardian is not acting in the patient's 
best interests, it would be appropriate 
to challenge the guardian on this 
issue. If the guardian is unwilling 
to reassess his or her decision 
making, the matter can always 
be brought before the court—the 
source of the guardian's authority. 
Notwithstanding the patient's evident 
desire to discontinue treatment, and 
without a court order, it would be 
unreasonable for the ethics committee 
(or the hospital for that matter) to 
discontinue treatment authorized by 
the guardian. Nothing in the facts 
presented indicate that the guardian's 
authority to speak for the patient has 
been curtailed or revoked.
If the guardian is willing to 
reassess the decision to commence 
chemotherapy, he or she should be 
encouraged to ascertain, as much as 
possible, the patient's basic values 
and preferences. Failing an ability 
to do that, I would recommend 
that the guardian talk, not only to 
medical oncologists, but also to 
cancer patients currently undergoing 
treatment, who are willing to share 
their story, so that the guardian can 
have a better appreciation for how 
a rational patient responds to the 
core question: is the adversity of 
chemotherapy worth the expected 
benefit?
Matthew d. Jenkins, J.d.
Partner, Hunton & Williams
Richmond, VA
coMMEnts fRoM A 
PhYsiciAn & Ethics 
coMMittEE chAiR
The central question in this case is whether the ethics committee and the guardian, 
acting on behalf of an incompetent 
patient, lacking advance directives, 
must adopt a vitalist principle: 
prolong life at any cost. This case 
is especially difficult as the patient 
appears to reject life, given his 
repeated attempts at suicide. Here, 
the committee must not only wrestle 
with the general problems of applying 
a substituted judgment or best 
interest test, but also with the choice 
of whether to accept a mentally ill 
patient's assessment that life is not 
worth living, or to explicitly override 
his wishes.
the Question of competency
The courts deem suicidal patients 
incompetent on the assumption that 
their feelings reflect irrational and 
profound depression — sane persons 
would not choose to take their own 
lives. In general, from the legal 
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perspective, no consideration is given 
to the possible causes of the patient's 
feelings, nor to the likelihood that the 
patient will ever achieve a condition 
in which such feelings were not 
present. Further, the state's interest 
in life per se is thought to justify 
paternalistic intervention when a 
patient represents a danger to himself 
(Childress, 1991; Greenberg, 1991). 
While, ethically, incompetence based 
on suicidality does not necessarily 
reflect generalized incapacity to 
make any and all medical decisions 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989), in 
this case, the patient's mental state 
directly affects a decision regarding 
life-lengthening chemotherapy. To 
the extent that his suicidal tendencies 
are irrational, his capacity to decide 
is impaired. In these circumstances, 
the committee should not support the 
patient's refusal of chemotherapy, 
nor, using a best interest assessment, 
consider the patient's apparent lack 
of desire to live. Given the absence 
of a pre-suicidal reference point, 
recommending chemotherapy 
seems the path of least resistance, as 
well as, consistent with the ethical 
commitment to treat and to prolong 
life. 
Best interest of the Patient
Best interest judgments are 
inherently problematic in our 
American environment, which is 
so heavily weighted toward respect 
for individual preference, however 
idiosyncratic (Gutheil & Appelbaum, 
1983). Absent adequate information 
about an individual's general values 
or specific preferences, one must ask 
what a "reasonable person" would do 
in similar circumstances (Canterbury 
v. Spence, 1972). One model for 
such decision making proposes a 
"community standard", invoking 
as the reference group the patient 
population served by a particular 
facility (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1993). 
While an attractive concept, this idea 
raises questions about how to identify 
the appropriate reference population. 
Hospitals typically do not serve 
homogeneous patient groups. Our 
own institution cares for incompetent, 
isolated individuals of many ethnic 
extractions, and socioeconomic or 
educational backgrounds. In this case, 
would the majority of patients in the 
hospital, to which this patient was 
involuntarily committed, share his 
values and experience?
The patient's social situation might 
also lead conscientious committee 
members to mistrust their own 
capacity to make a best interest 
judgment on his behalf. A committee 
of reasonably healthy, socially and 
economically comfortable individuals 
may realize that it is too easy for 
them to accept a homeless, deluded 
man's assessment of his life as not 
worth living. To offset these social 
biases and to avoid discriminating 
against this vulnerable man, 
the committee might, therefore, 
recommend treatment. When this 
concern is coupled with a mistrust of 
suicidality as a competent expression 
of will, the committee's safest moral 
course is to choose treatment which 
prolongs life, however compromised.
Another fact, which favors 
compelled treatment, is that the 
patient is homeless. This makes 
it unlikely that he is insured. As a 
result, even comfort care, through 
a home or in-patient hospice, may 
be unavailable. By insisting on 
treatment, the committee may believe 
it is ensuring the patient's access to 
pain relief and comfort measures that 
he might otherwise not receive.
Recommending chemotherapy 
will, however, only temporarily solve 
the committee's and the clinicians' 
dilemma. This man's condition will 
continue to deteriorate, necessitating 
rescue efforts which are more and 
more invasive, with increasingly 
lower probabilities of success. As 
a result, prior to the patient's death, 
the committee will continue to face 
questions about how much therapy he 
should be forced to undergo.
A Mental health treatment 
   Approach 
One alternative is for the committee 
to recommend coercive treatment 
with the goal of enhancing the 
patient's capacity to make a decision 
(thereby enhancing his autonomy), 
rather than for the beneficent purpose 
of cancer treatment (Buchanan & 
Brock, 1989). Using this approach, 
a vigorous trial of therapy, for 
both his delusional state and 
his depression, would precede a 
decision regarding chemotherapy. 
If he responds to treatment, a more 
reasonable discussion of cancer 
therapy will then be possible. 
Further, when such patients are in 
remission from their mental illness, 
they can be encouraged to enact 
advance directives in which they 
might consent to re-hospitalization 
and treatment during future relapses 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989). In 
this case, an advance directive 
would assist clinicians in both the 
management of the patient's mental 
illness, and his cancer treatment.
In some locales, it might be 
possible to ameliorate the patient's 
social situation, for instance, his 
homelessness, reducing his suicidal 
thoughts. However, rational decision 
making for all patients is expected to 
take into consideration the reality of 
their familial and economic situation 
Case Presentation
Cont. from page 11
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as they contemplate treatment. Ethics 
do not require the removal of all the 
burdens that might make this man 
unhappy or that lead him to refuse 
treatment, but only to mitigate, 
insofar as possible, demonstrably 
irrational ideation about his illness, its 
treatment, and its potential impact on 
his future.
What if the patient does become 
capable of understanding his disease, 
its prognosis and the implications of 
treatment, is no longer delusional, 
demonstrates capacity to decide, 
but remains pessimistic, even 
suicidal, despite an appropriate 
course of treatment? At this point, 
the committee must consider that the 
patient's emotional state is a fixed 
condition of his life. If no social 
or medical intervention is able to 
reverse it, his hopelessness may not 
be morally different than one patient's 
irremediable pain or another's fear 
of future disability. If the latters’ 
decisions about medical treatment 
are respected, then it seems only 
equitable to afford the same respect to 
the choices of this patient.
But what if psychiatric treatment 
fails to resolve the patient's delusions 
and/or inability to understand his 
condition and options? What if 
adequate psychiatric treatment 
cannot be enforced legally? In these 
circumstances, the committee should 
not recommend chemotherapy.
If he were not homeless, nor had a 
history of suicidality, but was rather 
an irreversibly incompetent, fifty-
eight year old white male, without 
advance directives or identifiable 
surrogates, would we feel obliged 
to choose chemotherapy on his 
behalf?   Here, the Saikewicz case 
provides insight (Superintendent 
of Belchertown State School v. 
Saikewicz, 1977). Joseph Saikewicz, 
at fifty-seven, had never been 
competent due to mental retardation, 
just as the patient in this case has 
no discoverable competent past. 
Similarly, Mr. Saikewicz faced 
treatment for cancer. The decision 
in the Saikewicz case, based on 
compassion for the potential sufferer, 
was to forego treatment. Likewise, 
in the case of our fifty-eight year 
old homeless man, neither our 
misgivings about psychiatric illness 
and suicidality, nor our collective 
responsibility for this man's 
homelessness should interfere with 
compassionate decision making. The 
ethics committee should, therefore, 
recommend comfort care for this 
patient, rejecting burdensome efforts 
to prolong his life, which this patient 
cannot comprehend.
Gail J. Povar, M.d.,M.P.h.
Chair, George Washington University 
Hospital Ethics Committee
Clinical Professor of Medicine, 
George Washington University 
School of Medicine and Health 
Sciences, Washington, D.C.
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now is a good time for health care 
providers, ethics committee members, 
bioethicists, policy makers, and dis-
ability rights advocates to join forces 
and identify common goals and how 
to achieve them.  
Anita J. tarzian, Phd, Rn
Ethics & Research Consultant, 
Baltimore, MD
MHECN Program Coordinator
*The social model of disability views 
the main causes of disability as being 
rooted in people’s negative attitudes 
toward persons with physical and 
mental impairments, and programs 
that keep persons with disabilities liv-
ing in institutions, unemployed, and 
isolated from meaningful work and 
social life. The medical model views 
disability as being caused merely by 
the physical or mental impairments 
themselves—impairments that can 
and should be treated or cured. 
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caleNDar of eVeNts
sEPtEMBER
17 (12:30 - 2:00 PM) Complete Lives in the Balance. Guest Lecture Series at the Hoffberger Center for Professional 
Ethics. Samuel Kerstein, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Maryland College Park, will examine 
the foundations of Kantian Ethics. Student Center Bogomolny Room, University of Baltimore, 1420 N. Charles St., 
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit http://www.ubalt.edu/template.cfm?page=3339.
18-19  Moral Distress in Health Care Symposium. Coast Plaza Hotel & Suites, 1763 Comox Street, Vancouver, BC. For 
more information, visit http://www.nursing.ubc.ca/IPONS/.
21 The Science, Ethics and Politics of Vaccine Mandates. Sponsored by the Center for Bioethics of the University of 
Pennsylvania, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, The University of Pennsylvania Health System, and the 
Society for Health Care Epidemiology of America. BRB Auditorium, 421 Curie Boulevard, Philadelphia, PA. To 
pre-register, contact Janice Pringle at jpringle@mail.med.upenn.edu or call 215-898-7136.
octoBER
sept. 30 - 
oct. 2  A Need to Confess? Writing About the Healthcare Experience. 8TH Annual Quandaries in Health Care Conference. 
The Given Institute of the University of Colorado, Aspen, Colorado. For more information, visit http://www.colora-
dobioethics.org/calendar_home.html.
3 Ethics of Invasive Brain Testing: Limits and Responsibilities. 19th International Cleveland Clinic Epilepsy Sympo-
sia. Cleveland, OH. For more information, visit http://www.ccf.org/neuroethics (click on NeuroEthics Symposia)
15-16 Open Hearts, Open Minds and Fair Minded Words: A Conference on Life and Choice in the Abortion Debate. 
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. For more information, visit http://nohiddenmagenta.wordpress.
com/2010/02/14/open-hearts-open-minds-and-fair-minded-words/, or contact Kim Girman at 
kgirman@princeton.edu.
21-24  Health and Community. The 12th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics & 
Humanities (ASBH). Hilton San Diego Bayfront Hotel, San Diego, CA. For more information,  
visit http://www.asbh.org.
noVEMBER
tBA End-of-life decision-making and Maryland Law - A Community Forum. Morning conference and afternoon round-
table discussions of Maryland's Health Care Decisions Act, focusing on issues related to withholding or withdraw-
ing medically ineffective treatment. Baltimore, MD. Check MHECN's website for more details at http://www.law.
umaryland.edu/mhecn (click on Conferences).
19  (12:30 – 2 p.m.) Negative Duties and the New Harms. Guest Lecture Series at the Hoffberger Center for Profession-
al Ethics. Judith Lichtenberg, Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, will speak about the challenges of 
justice and charity in a diverse society. Business Center Room 003, University of Baltimore, 1420 N. Charles St., 
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit http://www.ubalt.edu/template.cfm?page=3339.
19 New York’s 2010 Family Health Care Decisions Act and its Impact at the Hospitalized Patient’s Bedside. 2010 
AMBI Clinical Ethics Conference sponsored by Albany Medical College, Albany, NY. For more information, visit 
http://www.amc.edu/academic/bioethics/index.html.
dEcEMBER
3-4 Transforming Humanity: Fantasy? Dream? Nightmare? Sponsored by the Penn Center for Bioethics, and the Penn 
Center for Neuroscience & Society. For more information, contact John Schook at jshook@centerforinquiry,net, 
716-636-4869.
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